Follow-on Forces Attack
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Follow-on Forces Attack is a NATO doctrine that dates to the early 1980s and brought the Alliance to exploit the microchip revolution. The eight-point programme was proposed by SACEUR General Bernard W. Rogers.[1][2] It played a key role in NATO's Conceptual Military Framework and in the conventional leg of NATO's triad of deterrent forces.[3]
Synopsis[edit]
SACEUR Rogers was troubled by NATO's inadequate conventional military forces when faced with a Warsaw Pact that dominated his on a numeric basis, and ceteris paribus, he would need to resort to the nuclear option. To improve NATO's conventional defence capability, Rogers proposed a novel idea he labelled the "Follow-on Forces Attack" (FOFA) Concept, which theorized to counter a Warsaw Pact invasion by making deep conventional attacks the enemy's second and third echelon forces to prevent them from reaching NATO's defensive positions.[4]
FOFA was adopted by NATO in November 1984. The defects which were identified for remedy were:[5]
- Lack of suitable ground-launched missiles
- Inability to operate aircraft at night and in bad weather
- Inability to acquire and target moving vehicles at night and through clouds
- Inability to dynamically identify and target armored vehicles moving in and out of urban or other areas (reacquiring lost target tracks)
- Lack of effective integration of corps, division, and battalion capabilities to support maneuver forces across division control lines
- Defeating enemy air defenses, including shoulder-fired missiles
- Ever-increasing demands to increase the depth of sensors, targeting, and deep strike systems
- Requirements for unmanned aerial vehicles
Rogers saw the technological basis for change lying in the microchip, which created new possibilities for high-speed, real-time data processing, as well as in micro-electronic sensor technology, notable for important applications in reconnaissance and target acquisition.[6]
Operationally, the FOFA concept was simply to interdict Soviet follow-on-forces located 24, 48, and 72 hours removed from NATO defensive positions. The problem was: to coordinate deep battle and air interdiction efforts out to 150 kilometers behind the line of contact, or roughly 72 hours away from it; and to plan for airborne deep strike missions 300 kilometers into the enemy's rear; and developing technology and doctrine to enable commanders quickly to adapt air strikes and fire missions. FOFA was the first "systems-of-systems" architecture. As of 2015 nearly 100 FOFA systems were integrated into the mix available to battle commanders.[5]
References[edit]
- ^ "Technologies for NATO's Follow-on Forces Attack Concept: A Special Report of OTA's Assessment on Improving NATO's Defense Response" (PDF). Congress of the U.S., Office of Technology Assessment. July 1986.
- ^ "New technology for NATO: implementing Follow-On Forces Attack". United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. June 1987.
- ^ Diver, Michael J. (1 July 1990). "NATO's Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) Concept: Past, Present and Future" (PDF). ADA224090. No. CARLISLE BARRACKS PA. ARMY WAR COLLEGE.
- ^ "1979-1989: "DUAL TRACK" DECADE - NEW WEAPONS, NEW TALKS". Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Retrieved 30 January 2023.
- ^ a b TOMES, ROBERT (20 November 2014). "THE COLD WAR OFFSET STRATEGY: ASSAULT BREAKER AND THE BEGINNING OF THE RSTA REVOLUTION". METAMORPHIC MEDIA.
- ^ Chapter, "The Role of New Technologies and Follow-on Forces Attack in NATO Strategy" author Fen Osler Hampson. Book Defending Europe published 1985 by Routledge