MiG-23 | |
---|---|
A Soviet Air Force MiG-23MLD | |
Role | Fighter aircraft (M series). Fighter-bomber (B series) |
National origin | Soviet Union |
Manufacturer | Mikoyan-Gurevich / Mikoyan |
First flight | 10 June 1967 |
Introduction | 1970 |
Status | In limited service |
Primary users | Soviet Air Force (historical). Syrian Air Force. Indian Air force (historical). Bulgarian Air Force (historical). See Operatorsbelow |
Produced | 1967–1985 |
Number built | 5,047 |
Unit cost | $3.6–6.6 million (1980) |
Variants | Mikoyan MiG-27 |
The Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23(Russian : Микоян и Гуревич МиГ-23; NATO reporting name : Flogger) is a variable-geometry fighter aircraft, designed by the Mikoyan-Gurevich design bureau in the Soviet Union. It is a third-generation jet fighter, the world's most-produced variable-geometry aircraft, along with similar Soviet fighters such as the Su-15 "Flagon". It was the first Soviet fighter to field a look-down/shoot-down radar and one of the first to be armed with beyond-visual-range missiles. Production started in 1969 and reached large numbers with over 5,000 aircraft built. Today the MiG-23 remains in limited service with some export customers.
The basic design was also used as the basis for the Mikoyan MiG-27, a dedicated ground-attack variant. Among many minor changes, the MiG-27 replaced the MiG-23's nose-mounted radar system with an optical panel holding a laser designator and a TV camera.
The MiG-23's predecessor, the MiG-21, was fast and agile, but limited in its operational capabilities by its primitive radar, short range, and limited weapons load (restricted in some aircraft to a pair of short-range R-3/K-13 (AA-2 "Atoll") air-to-air missiles ). Work began on a replacement for the MiG-21 in the early 1960s. The new aircraft was required to have better performance and range than the MiG-21, while carrying more capable avionics and weapons including beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles. A major design consideration was take-off and landing performance. The VVS demanded the new aircraft have a much shorter take-off run. Low-level speed and handling was also to be improved over the MiG-21. Manoeuvrability was not an urgent requirement. This led Mikoyan to consider two options: lift jets, to provide an additional lift component, and variable-geometry wings, which had been developed by TsAGI for both "clean-sheet" aircraft designs and adaptations of existing designs.
MiG-23 parked. A Polish MiG-23MFThe first option, for an aircraft fitted with lift jets, resulted in the "23-01", also known as the MiG-23PD(Podyomnye Dvigatyeli – lift jet), was a tailed delta of similar layout to the smaller MiG-21 but with two lift jets in the fuselage. This first flew on 3 April 1967, but it soon became apparent that this configuration was unsatisfactory, as the lift jets became useless dead weight once airborne. Work on the second strand of development was carried out in parallel by a team led by A.A Andreyev, with MiG directed to build a variable-geometry prototype, the "23-11" in 1965.
The 23-11 featured variable-geometry wings which could be set to angles of 16, 45 and 72 degrees, and it was clearly more promising. The maiden flight of 23–11 took place on 10 June 1967, flown by the famous MiG test pilot Aleksandr Vasilyevich Fedotov (who set the absolute altitude record in 1977 in a Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25 ). Six more flight prototypes and two static-test prototypes were prepared for further flight and system testing. All featured the Tumansky R-27-300 turbojet engine with a thrust of 77 kN (17,300 lbf ). The order to start series production of the MiG-23 was given in December 1967. The first production "MiG-23S" (NATO reporting name 'Flogger-A') took to the air on 21 May 1969, with Fedotov at the controls.
The General Dynamics F-111 and McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II were the main Western influences on the MiG-23. The Soviets, however, wanted a much lighter, single-engined fighter to maximize agility. Both the F-111 and the MiG-23 were designed as fighters, but the heavy weight and inherent stability of the F-111 turned it into a long-range interdictor and kept it out of the fighter role. The MiG-23's designers kept the MiG-23 light and agile enough to dogfight with enemy fighters.
The MiG-23's armament evolved as the type's avionics were upgraded and new variants were deployed. The earliest versions, which were equipped with the MiG-21's fire control system, were limited to firing variants of the R-3/K-13 (AA-2 "Atoll") missile. The R-60 (AA-8 "Aphid") replaced the R-3 during the 1970s, and from the MiG-23M onwards the BVR R-23/R-24 (AA-7 "Apex") was carried. The MiG-23MLD is capable of firing the R-73 (AA-11 "Archer"), but this missile was not exported until the MiG-29 was released for export. The helmet-mounted sight associated with the R-73 missile was fitted on the MiG-23MLDG and other experimental MiG-23MLD subvariants that never entered production as had been originally planned. The reason was that these MiG-23MLD subvariants had less priority than the then ongoing MiG-29 program, and the Mikoyan bureau therefore decided to concentrate all their efforts on the MiG-29 program and halted further work on the MiG-23. Nevertheless, a helmet-mounted sight is now offered as part of the MiG-23-98 upgrade. There were reports of the MiG-23MLD being capable of firing the R-27 (AA-10 "Alamo") beyond experimental tests; however, it seems only Angola's MiG-23-98s are capable of doing so. A MiG-23 was used to test and fire the R-27, R-73, and R-77 (AA-12 "Adder") air-to-air missiles during their early flight and firing trials. Ground-attack armament includes 57 mm rocket pods, general-purpose bombs up to 500 kg in size, gun pods, and Kh-23 (AS-7 "Kerry") radio-guided missiles. Up to four external fuel tanks could be carried.
The MiG-23's cockpit was considered an improvement over previous Soviet fighters as it took greater account of human factors in its layout. It was however a "very busy" cockpit, preoccupying the pilot with manipulating switches and monitoring gauges, compared to more modern aircraft with HOTAS controls. The instrument panel did feature a white stripe to serve as a visual aid for centering the control column during an out-of-control situation. To prevent the pilot from exceeding a 17° angle of attack, the control column incorporated a "knuckle rapper" which would strike the pilot's knuckles as they approached the limit.
Cockpit visibility was also somewhat poor in the MiG-23, although the view straight ahead was superior compared to the MiG-21. In particular visibility was poor looking to the rear, partially due to the fighter's ejection seat which wrapped around the pilot's head, requiring the pilot to lean forward to look to the side or behind them. To assist with looking directly behind the pilot, the cockpit was fitted with a mirror or 'periscope' embedded in the middle rail of the canopy similar to on the MiG-17. With an infinity focus, the periscope provided a clear view of behind the plane, but did not have a wide field of view.
The MiG-23's ejection seat, the KM-1, was built with extreme altitude and speed in mind: leg stirrups, shoulder harness, pelvic D-ring, and a 3-parachute system. Engaging the ejection seat could take a long time, as the pilot had to place their feet in the stirrups, let go of the control column, grab the two trigger handles, squeeze and lift them. The first parachute, the size of a large handkerchief, was deployed out of a telescoping rod which would pop out of the top back of the seat as it started to clear the windscreen windbreak area. It was supposed to help rotate the seat into the windblast and stabilize into a flight path that would take it above and behind the vertical stabilizer. As the first chute and rod separated from the seat, a larger drogue parachute deployed to slow down the seat, allowing the deployment of the main parachute. If engaged at low altitudes, the seat included a barometric element that allowed the drogue chute to separate more quickly. One problem with the KM-1 was that it was not a zero-zero ejection seat, and would only work at a minimum speed of 90 knots.
The MiG-23 was among the first Soviet aircraft to feature variable-geometry wings. These were hydraulically controlled by means of a small lever set beneath the throttle in the cockpit. There were three main sweep angles that were set by the pilot for different levels of flying. The first, with the wings fully spread at 16°, was used when cruising at below Mach.7 or when taking off and landing. Putting the wings at mid-spread of 45° was used for basic fighter maneuvering, as well as cruising at high speeds or making low-altitude intercepts. Moving the wings to fully swept at 72° was reserved for making high-altitude intercepts or high-speed dashes at low altitudes. Starting with the Type 1971 model the MiG-23's wings had their surface area increased by 20%, necessitating the positions be changed to 18°, 47° 40', and 74° 40' (though for convenience the cockpit indicators and manuals retained the original labeling).
The wings were not fitted with ailerons but did possess spoilers to control rolling when the wings were at 16° and 45° angles. In addition to the spoilers, the wings were also fitted with trailing edge flaps and leading edge slats to try and give the fighter a short take-off and landing performance. Although there was a gauge in the cockpit showing what position the wings were currently set, where they were in motion, and the Mach limit for each position, there was none to indicate what was the optimum wing position based on the surrounding conditions.
Two tailerons controlled pitch and roll, in the latter case working in conjunction with the wings when they were not fully swept back. In addition to a fairly large vertical stabilizer (which also stored the brake parachute for landings), the MiG-23 featured a ventral fin to improve directional stability at high speeds. During take-off and landings, the fin was designed to fold sideways any time the landing gears were extended so it would not scrape against the ground.
The MiG-23's original engine was a powerful Tumansky R-29 -300 that could generate 27,500 lb (12,500 kg) of thrust, easily taking the fighter to its top speed of Mach 2.4. It also had excellent acceleration, requiring just 3–4 seconds to go from idle to full power, and less than a second to ignite the afterburner. In fact, the engine was so powerful that the MiG-23 could technically go faster than its placarded top speed, but doing so would cause the cockpit canopy to implode. The engine's intake featured a system of louvers which took surplus bleed air for use by the plane's environmental control system to keep the avionics and pilot cool.
However, like early examples of the F-4 Phantom 's J-79 engine, the R-29 would generate smoke when at non-afterburn power. The R-29 also ran extremely hot, which sometimes triggered false fire alarms. Moreover, the engine was only good for a couple of hundred sorties at most before requiring replacement. Partly this was due to the fact that Russian engines were designed to last about 150 hours before being replaced. It was also a way to make money back from export customers by selling them new engines in exchange for hard currency. Getting the engine in or out of the MiG-23 could be an issue as it required the plane be pulled in half.
The engine was also a weak point on early models of the MiG-23 as its mounting was not stressed for strong yaw movement. In the event the fighter went into a spin, the engine shaft could warp from the motion. This would cause the compressor blades to tear out the louvers, which would go into the turbine section and cause the turbine blades to break off, fly everywhere and destroy the engine. The problem was solved with the introduction of the R-29B-300 which was better suited to this motion.
Early models of the MiG-23 also ran into the problem that the plane's fuel tank, located in the fuselage wingbox, were integral to the structure rather contained within a fuel bladder. This meant that as the structure developed hairline fractures fuel would seep out, requiring severe g-force limits until a solution could be found. Until structure quality was improved in later models, one fix was to weld a plate on the inside surface and a stiffener on the outer skin.
Most potential enemies of the USSR and its client states have had opportunities to evaluate the MiG-23's performance. In the summer of 1977, after a political realignment by the Egyptian government, Egypt provided a number of MiG-23MSs and MiG-23BNs to the United States; these were evaluated under a pair of exploitation programs codenamed HAVE PAD and HAVE BOXER respectively. These and other MiGs, including additional MiG-23s acquired through other sources, were used as part of a secret training program known as project Constant Peg to familiarize American pilots with Soviet aircraft. Additionally, a Cuban pilot flew a MiG-23BN to the U.S. in 1991, and a Libyan MiG-23 pilot also defected to Greece in 1981. In both cases, the aircraft were later repatriated.
Initially, American intelligence on the MiG-23 assumed that the fighter could turn well and had reasonable acceleration capability, but testing during HAVE PAD proved this assumption to be incorrect. While its turning capability was comparable to an original F-4E Phantom, newer American fighters like the F-15 Eagle or F-4E upgraded with slats could easily out-turn the MiG-23 in a dogfight. In fact, whenever the MiG-23 approached high angle of attack it became very unstable and liable to leave controlled flight. Conversely, the MiG-23's acceleration capability was tremendous, particularly at low altitudes (below 10,000 ft (3,000 m)) and crossing the sound barrier, where it could out-accelerate any American fighter. The fighter's small profile gave it the advantage of being hard to spot visually as well. Overall, HAVE PAD testing determined that the MiG-23 - while a poor dogfighter - made for a good interceptor capable of performing hit-and-run attacks. Despite its limitations, in the hands of a very capable pilot the MiG-23 represented a serious threat in air combat.
Test pilots who flew the MiG-23 as part of Constant Peg came to similar conclusions about the MiG-23 being an effective interceptor rather than a dogfighter, but were more critical of the planes they flew. Among their complaints was that the MiG-23's airframe was too easily overstressed; that it was unstable in yaw as it passed the sound barrier and again when approaching Mach 2; that its narrow landing gear, although designed to be used on unprepared surfaces, tended to slip and slide in adverse weather conditions; and because it sat low to the ground, it could more easily suck debris into its engine intakes. In general the MiG-23 was unpopular with the American pilots because it was so dangerous to fly.
Among the nicknames the Constant Peg pilots had for the MiG-23 was the "Looping Hog" because it flew like a pig and one of the few basic fighter maneuvers (BFM) it could pull off in a dogfight was a massive loop. If going fast enough, a MiG-23 could easily perform a loop 4 mi (6.4 km) high that other planes would struggle to follow, at the bottom of which it would cut back inside them and proceed to fly off until outside their visual range so it could come back in again. The only other BFM the MiG-23 could perform, according to Col (ret.) John "Sax" Saxman, was the "no circle fight ": as the two aircraft approached and passed close by each other the MiG-23, instead of trying to turn one way or the other with the enemy aircraft (as in a one-circle or two-circle fight), would speed on ahead until it could come back into the fight from a different angle.
The MiG-23's deficits and qualities were also recognized by allied air forces who received the fighter from the Soviet Union, including the East German Air Force :
I spent a lot of time in Berlin watching GCI tapes to verify we were flying the right tactics, and it became clear to me that the East Germans knew exactly what the MiG-23's limitations were. They knew that since it was unmaneuverable, they had to attack from many different directions as fast as possible. It was sophisticated, and they were going to overwhelm us if we ever went up against them. I sat down with some analysts and linguists and listened to what the pilots were saying to their GCI controllers and I actually started to respect them for what they were doing with a very limited asset.
— Cdr (ret.) Marty Macy, 4477th Test and Evaluation SquadronThe pilots of Constant Peg sought to teach these and other aspects of the MiG-23 to the frontline Tactical Air Command squadrons (nicknamed Blue Air) against whom they trained. "We taught the guys that if you were defensive with a Flogger right behind you, then you were automatically offensive, because even the worst pilot in the world would be able to deny him the shot. You would turn, he would try and turn with you, but he would never be able to turn the same corner as you," according to Col (ret.) Paco Geisler. As recalled by LtCol (USMC ret.) Lenny Bucko regarding two vs two training: "One of the MiG-23s would retreat while the other guy would come in behind you. In the training environment the Blue Air pilots would do their intercepts at 350 to 400 knots, so when they all of a sudden get this Flogger coming at Mach 1.5, it really changes the geometry of things. It blows your mind because you are not used to seeing that kind of speed."
The MiG-23's speed in particular was used as a teaching aid for a couple of situations during a potential war with the Soviet Union. The first was at low altitudes to demonstrate its ability to run down any NATO or American strike aircraft (barring the late-model F-111F Aardvark ), which would be attempting to go low and fast to penetrate Soviet territory. The second was to simulate the MiG-25 Foxbat, a high, fast flyer (HHF) which would be going after high-value targets such as aerial refueling or airborne early warning and control aircraft like the E-3 Sentry.
The early MiG-23M series was also used to test the American Northrop F-5s captured by the North Vietnamese and sent to the former USSR for evaluation. The Russians acknowledged the F-5 was a very agile aircraft, and at some speeds and altitudes better than the MiG-23M, one of the main reasons the MiG-23MLD and MiG-29 developments were started. These tests allowed the Russians to make modifications to several of their fourth-generation aircraft. The MiG-23, however, was not designed to combat F-5s, a weakness reflected by early MiG-23 variants.
Dutch pilot Leon van Maurer, who had more than 1,200 hours flying F-16s, flew against MiG-23MLs from air bases in Germany and the U.S. as part of NATO's aerial mock combat training with Soviet equipment. He concluded the MiG-23ML was superior in the vertical to early F-16 variants, just slightly inferior to the F-16A in the horizontal, and had superior BVR capability. The Soviet combat manual for MiG-23M pilots claims the MiG-23M to have a slight superiority over the F-4 and Kfir, and describes combat history involving Syrian MiG-23MFs versus Israeli F-15 and F-16s, which it labels "successful". This manual also recommends tactics to be used against these fighters.
Western and Russian aviation historians usually differ in respect to combat record for their military vehicles and doctrines part due to the bias in favor of their respective national industries and academies. They also usually accept claims going along with their respective political views since usually many conflicting and contradictory reports are written and accepted by their respective historians. Before recent years, with widespread use of hand portable cameras, little pictorial evidence could be published about specific losses and victories of the different combat systems, with a limited number of losses and victories confirmed by both parties.
Because of its distinctive appearance with large air intakes on both sides of the fuselage the aircraft was nicknamed "Cheburashka " by some Soviet pilots after a popular Russian cartoon character representing a fictional animal with big ears. The nickname did not stick and was later firmly assigned to Antonov An-72/74, although to this day it is sometimes applied to different aircraft with similar exterior features, including the USAF A-10 Thunderbolt II.
The aircraft was not used in large numbers by the non-Soviet air forces of the Warsaw Pact as originally envisioned. When the MiG-23s were initially deployed, they were considered the elites of the Eastern Bloc air forces. However, very quickly the disadvantages became evident and the MiG-23 did not replace the MiG-21 as initially intended. The aircraft had some deficiencies that limited its operational serviceability and its hourly operating cost was thus higher than the MiG-21s. The Eastern Bloc air forces used their MiG-23s to replace MiG-17s and MiG-19s still in service.
By 1990, over 1,500 MiG-23s of different models were in service with the VVS and the V-PVO. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the new Russian Air Force began to cut back its fighter force, and it was decided the single-engined MiG-23s and MiG-27s were to be retired to operational storage. The last model to serve was the MiG-23P air defense variant and it was retired on 1 May 1998.
When East and West Germany unified, no MiG-23s were transferred to the German Air Force, but twelve former East German MiG-23s were supplied to the US. When Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Czechs received all the MiG-23s, which were retired in 1998. Hungary retired their MiG-23s in 1996, Poland in 1999, Romania in 2000, and Bulgaria in 2004.
The MiG-23 was the Soviet Air Force's "Top Gun "-equivalent aggressor aircraft from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. It proved a difficult opponent for early MiG-29 variants flown by inexperienced pilots. Exercises showed when well-flown, a MiG-23MLD could achieve favorable kill ratios against the MiG-29 in mock combat by using hit-and-run tactics and not engaging the MiG-29s in dogfights. Usually the aggressor MiG-23MLDs had a shark mouth painted on the nose just aft of the radome, and many were piloted by Soviet–Afghan War veterans. In the late 1980s, these aggressor MiG-23s were replaced by MiG-29s, also featuring shark mouths.
Soviet MiG-23s were used over Afghanistan. Some of them were claimed to have been shot down.
Soviet and Afghan MiG-23s and Pakistani F-16s clashed a few times during the Soviet–Afghan War from 1987. Two MiG-23 were claimed shot down in air to air fight by Pakistani F-16s when crossing the border (they both were not confirmed) while one F-16 was shot down on 29 April 1987. Pakistani and Western sources consider it a friendly fire incident but the Soviet-backed Afghan government of the time claimed that Soviet aircraft downed the Pakistani F-16 – a claim that The New York Times and the Washington Post also reported. According to a Russian version of the event, the F-16 was shot down when Pakistani F-16s encountered Soviet MiG-23MLDs. Soviet MiG-23MLD pilots, while on a bombing raid along the Pakistani-Afghan border, reported being attacked by F-16s and then seeing one F-16 explode. It could have been downed by gunfire from a MiG whose pilot did not report the kill, because Soviet pilots were not allowed to attack Pakistani aircraft without permission.
In 1988, Soviet MiG-23MLDs using R-23s (NATO: AA-7 "Apex") downed two Iranian AH-1J Cobras that had intruded into Afghan airspace. In a similar incident a decade earlier, on 21 June 1978, a PVO MiG-23M flown by Pilot Captain V. Shkinder shot down two Iranian Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters that had trespassed into Soviet airspace, one helicopter being dispatched by two R-60 missiles and the other by cannon fire.
The USSR supported the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen with Soviet Air Force MiG-23BN and MiG-25R based in Aden starting from the late Seventies. During the South Yemen Civil War in January 1986, the Soviet MiG-23BN fleet flew strikes in support of loyalist forces. It is not clear if these MiG-23 were ever transferred to the South Yemeni control and later to the unified Yemeni Air Force or they always remained under Soviet control and withdrew later.
The first MiG-23s were supplied to Syria on 14 October 1973, when two MiG-23MSs and two MiG-23UBs were shipped in crates, aboard An-12 B transports. By the time these planes could be assembled, flight-tested and their crews made combat ready, the war with Israel was over. During 1974 several Syrian MiG-23s were lost in accidents. The process of making the MiG-23 operational was complex and difficult, and only eight were operational by 1974. The first MiG-23s to see combat were export variants with many limitations. For example, the MiG-23MS lacked a radar warning receiver. In addition, compared to the MiG-21, the aircraft was mechanically complex and expensive and also less agile. Early export variants also lacked many "war reserve modes" in their radars, making them vulnerable against electronic countermeasures (ECM), at which the Israelis were especially proficient.
On 13 April 1974, after almost 100 days of artillery exchanges and skirmishes along the Golan Heights, Syrian helicopters delivered commandos to attack the Israeli observation post at Jebel Sheikh. This provoked heavy clashes in the air and on the ground for almost a week. On 19 April 1974, Captain al-Masry, flying a MiG-23MS on a weapons test mission, spotted a group of IAF F-4 Es and shot two of them down after firing three missiles. He was about to attack another F-4 with cannon fire, but was shot down by friendly fire from a SAM battery. Due to this success, an additional 24 MiG-23MS interceptors, as well as a similar number of MiG-23BN strike variants, were delivered to Syria during the following year. In 1978 deliveries of MiG-23MFs started and two squadrons were equipped with them.
The MiG-23MF, MiG-23MS and MiG-23BN were used in combat by Syria over Lebanon between 1981 and 1985. On 26 April 1981, Syria claimed that two Israeli A-4 Skyhawks attacking a camp in Sidon were shot down by two MiG-23MSs. However, Israel does not report any loss of aircraft from this incident and no loss of aircraft was reported on that date. Russian historian Vladimir Ilyin writes that the Syrians lost six MiG-23MFs, four MiG-23MSs and a few MiG-23BNs in June 1982. One more MiG-23 fighter was lost in July. The Israelis also claimed that they shot down two MiG-23s in 1985, which the Syrians deny. Overall, 11–13 Syrian MiG-23 fighter variants were lost in air combat from 1982 to 1985. Israel confirms only loss of BQM-34 Firebee which was downed by Syrian MiG-23MF on 6 June 1982.
At the end of April 2002 Syrian MiG-23ML shot down an Israeli UAV with an air-to-air missile near As-Suwayda.
A former Syrian Air Force MiG-23MS became iconic of the Siege of Abu al-Duhur Airbase : on 7 March 2012, Syrian rebels used a 9K115-2 Metis-M anti-tank guided missile to hit the derelict MiG. Later, in March 2013 they entered in the base, showing the worn out and damaged MiG. Finally, in May 2013, the Syrian Air Force bombed it to completely destroy the wreck.
Syrian MiG-23BNs bombed the city of Aleppo on 24 July 2012, becoming the first use of fixed-wing aircraft for bombing in the Syrian civil war.
On 13 August 2012, a Syrian MiG-23BN was reportedly shot down by the rebels of the Free Syrian Army near Deir ez-Zor, although the government claimed that it went down due to technical difficulties.
Since then, Syrian Air Force MiG-23s together with different Syrian Air Force fighter jets have regularly been spotted performing attack runs on Syrian insurgents, who have claimed different MiGs being shot down or destroyed on the ground on different occasions.
On 23 March 2014, one Syrian MiG-23 was shot down after being hit by an AIM-9 Sidewinder fired by a Turkish F-16 in the vicinity of the Syrian town of Kessab. The pilot ejected safely and was recovered by friendly forces. Turkish sources said the fighter violated Turkish airspace and it was downed after several radio warnings while approaching the border. Another Syrian MiG-23 returned to Syria after trespassing into Turkish airspace.
On 15 June 2017, one Jordanian Selex ES Falco UAV was shot down by a Syrian MiG-23MLD in the vicinity of the Syrian town of Derra. On 16 June, another Selex ES Falco was shot down by MiG-23ML both using R-24R missiles.
On 9 September 2020, a Syrian MiG-23 crashed in Deir ez-Zor Governorate without information on the fate of its pilot.
The MiG-23 took part in the Iran–Iraq War and was used in both air-to-air and air-to-ground roles. The reports about performance in air combat are mixed – some authors claim that Iraqi MiG-23s had some victories and several losses against Iranian F-14s, F-5s and F-4s.
According to researcher Tom Cooper, Iranian F-14s caused exceptionally heavy losses to the MiG-23s (most of them bombers, model MiG-23BN) early in the war, much to the disappointment of the Iraqi Air Force, which thought that the Soviet fighter would be a match for the Tomcat. During the Iran-Iraq War at least 58 MiG-23s are claimed to be shot down by F-14s (15 of these are confirmed according to Cooper), and 20 MiG-23s are claimed by F-4s (16 confirmed according to Cooper). According to official Iraqi data only 29 MiG-23s were lost during the entire war (between 20 and 28 of them were shot down by AAA, enemy fighters or friendly fire).
On 2 August 1990, the Iraqi Air Force supported the invasion of Kuwait with MiG-23BN and Su-22 aircraft as the main strike assets. A number of Iraqi aircraft and helicopters were claimed shot down by Kuwaiti air defense MIM-23 Hawk SAM sites, among them a MiG-23BN.
Iraqi documents captured after the invasion of Iraq revealed that they possessed 127 MiG-23s, included 38 MiG-23BNs and 21 MiG-23 trainers, at the start of Operation Desert Storm. During the Gulf War, the United States Air Force reported downing eight Iraqi MiG-23s with F-15s. Iraqi documents confirm the total destruction of 43 MiG-23s from all causes, with another 10 damaged and 12 others fleeing to Iran. This left Iraq with just 63 MiG-23s after the war, including 18 Mig-23BNs and 12 trainers.
The United States stated that the losses of the F-16Cs were caused by 2K12 Kub and S-125 Neva/Pechora surface-to-air missiles rather than enemy aircraft. Also, no Tornado loss is attributed to enemy aircraft as per the Royal Air Force and the Italian Air Force.
On 17 January 1993, a USAF F-16C destroyed an Iraqi MiG-23 with an AMRAAM missile. On 9 September 1999, a lone MiG-23 crossed the no-fly zone heading towards a flight of F-14s. One F-14 fired an AIM-54 Phoenix at the MiG but missed and the MiG headed back north.
In 2003, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the entire Iraqi Air Force remained grounded with several airframes found by US and allied forces around the Iraqi air bases in derelict condition after the invasion. The invasion marked the end of Iraqi service for the MiG-23.
Cuban MiG-23MLs and South African Mirage F1 pilots had several encounters during the Cuban intervention in Angola, one of which resulted in severe damage to a Mirage F1.
On 27 September 1987, during Operation Moduler, two MiG-23 pilots surprised a pair of Mirages and fired missiles: Alberto Ley Rivas engaged a Mirage flown by Capt Arthur Douglas Piercy with a pair of R-23Rs (some sources say a R-60 ), while the other Cuban pilot fired a single R-60 at a Mirage flown by Captain Carlo Gagiano. Although the missiles homed on the Mirages, only one R-23R exploded close enough to cause damage to the landing hydraulics of Capt Piercy's Mirage (and, according to some accounts, the aircraft's drag chute ). The damage likely contributed to the Mirage veering off the runway on landing, after which the nose gear collapsed. The nose hit the ground so hard that Piercy's ejection seat fired. As a result of this ground level ejection, Piercy was paralyzed. The aircraft was written off, but a large portion of the airframe and components were used to repair another accident damaged Mirage F-1 and return it to service. In total, the Cubans claimed 6 air victories with the MiG-23 (1 destroyed, 1 damaged and 4 were unconfirmed).
FAPLA MiG-23s outclassed SAAF Mirage F-1 CZ and F-1AZ fighters in terms of power/acceleration, radar/avionics capabilities, and air-to-air weapons. The MiG-23's R-23 and R-60 missiles gave FAPLA pilots the ability to engage SAAF aircraft from most aspects. The SAAF, hobbled by an international arms embargo, was forced to carry an obsolescent version of the French Matra R.550 Magic missile or early-generation V-3 Kukri missiles, which had limited range and performance relative to the R-60 and R-23. Despite these limitations, SAAF pilots were able to vector within the firing envelope and fire AAMs at MiG-23s (gun camera shots evidence this). The missiles either missed or exploded ineffectually behind in the tail plume rather than homing on the hot airframe.
UNITA rebels, opposing Cuban/MPLA forces, shot down a number of MiG-23s with American-supplied FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS missiles. South African ground forces shot down a MiG-23, which was prosecuting a raid on the Calueque Dam, by using the Ystervark (porcupine) 20 mm AA gun.
Libya received a total of 54 MiG-23MS and MiG-23Us between 1974 and 1976, followed by a similar number of MiG-23BNs. Many of these were immediately put into storage, but at least 20 MiG-23MSs and MiG-23UBs entered service with the 1023rd Squadron and 1124th Squadron.
One Libyan MiG-23MS was shot down by an Egyptian MiG-21 fighter during and immediately after the Libyan–Egyptian War in 1977 while supporting a strike on the airfield at Mersa-Matruh, forcing the remaining MiG to abort the mission. In one skirmish in 1979, two LARAF MiG-23MS engaged two EAF MiG-21MF which had been upgraded to carry Western air-to-air missiles such as the AIM-9P3 Sidewinder. The Libyan pilots made the mistake of trying to outmaneuver the more nimble Egyptian MiG-21s, and one MiG-23MS was shot down by Maj. Sal Mohammad with an AIM-9P3 Sidewinder missile, while the other used its superior speed to escape.
On 18 July 1980, the wreckage of an LARAF MiG-23MS was found on the northern side of Mount Sila, in the middle of the Italian province of Calabria. The deceased pilot, Captain Ezzedin Fadhel Khalil, was found still strapped to his ejection seat.
Libyan MiG-23s were employed during the Chadian–Libyan conflict performing different roles in the 1980s. On 5 January 1987, a Libyan MiG-23 was shot down and few months later, on 5 September 1987, Chadian forces performed a land raid against Maaten al-Sarra Air Base in Libya, destroying several Libyan aircraft on the ground, among them, three MiG-23s.
Two Libyan MiG-23MS fighters were shot down by U.S. Navy F-14s in the Second Gulf of Sidra incident in 1989.
In the 2011 Libyan civil war, Libyan Air Force MiG-23s were used to bomb rebel positions. On 15 March 2011, a rebel website reported that opposition forces started using a captured MiG-23 and a helicopter to sink 2 loyalist ships and bomb some tank positions.
On 19 March 2011, a MiG-23BN of the Free Libyan Air Force was shot down over Benghazi by its own air defenses, who mistook it for a loyalist aircraft. The pilot was killed after he ejected too late.
On 26 March 2011, five MiG-23s together with two Mi-35 helicopters were destroyed by the French Air Force while parked at Misrata airport, early reports misidentified the fixed wing aircraft as G-2 Galebs.
On 9 April, a rebel MiG-23 was intercepted over Benghazi by NATO aircraft and escorted back to its base for violating the UN no-fly zone.
A limited number of MiG-23's which survived the 2011 Libyan civil war and NATO bombings were involved in air strikes between the opposing Libyan House of Representatives and the rival General National Congress during the Second Libyan Civil War with both parties controlling a limited number of aircraft.
On 23 March 2015, a New General National Congress operated MiG-23UB was shot down while bombing Al Watiya airbase, controlled by the Libyan House of Representative probably with an Igla-S MANPADS. Both pilots were killed. At the beginning of 2016, Libyan House of Representatives forces controlled three airworthy MiG-23s among other aircraft, two MiG-23MLA and one MiG-23UB. They were all lost in three separate occasions with a first MiG-23MLA, serial 6472, lost near Benina airbase on 4 January, after an airstrike, the second MiG-23MLA, serial 6132, lost on 8 February while conducting air strikes against Islamic State near Derna and the MiG-23UB, serial 7834, lost on 12 February 2016 while operating west of Benghazi, claimed shot down by the Islamic State with the official government attributing the loss to anti aircraft artillery. In all the occasions the aircrews ejected while the cause of the first two crashes remained debated between hostile fire and mechanical causes.
On 28 February 2016, a MiG-23MLA serial 6453 was restored to flying status after several years, becoming the only MiG-23 in service with the Libyan Air Force as of March 2016, performing missions against enemy positions and vehicles since March 2016.
In the following weeks, both the Libyan Air Force and the opposing Libyan Dawn Air Force, restored a number of MiG-23BN, MiG-23ML and MiG-23UB to flying status and they were recorded while flying over Libyan skyes and striking enemy positions.
On 6 December 2019, a Libyan National Army (LNA) MiG-23MLD was shot down by forces loyal to the Government of National Accord (GNA). In the ongoing Libyan Civil War both parties are pushing back to service stored airframes after repairs with foreign assistance. The jet, serial 26144, was restored using the wings of two different airframes and became flyable again in August 2019, after around 20 years of storage. The jet was hit over the Yarmouk frontline in southern Tripoli and crashed in Al Zawiya city and the pilot, Amer Jagem was detained after ejecting. A video emerged showing the aircraft diving for attack with soldiers on the ground firing a Strela-2M MANPADS in response. The LNA reported they lost a MiG-23 due to technical fault, denying it crashed due to enemy fire.
Egypt became one of the first export customers when in 1974 bought eight MiG-23MS interceptors, eight MiG-23BN strikers and four MIG-23U trainers, concentrating them into a single regiment based at Mersa Matruh. By 1975 all Egyptian MiG-23s had been withdrawn from active duty and placed in storage due to the Egyptian foreign policy shifting towards the West and thus losing USSR support.
In 1978 China purchased two MiG-23MS interceptors, two MiG-23BNs, two MiG-23Us, ten MiG-21MFs, and ten KSR-2 (AS-5 Kelt) air-to-surface missiles in exchange for spare parts and technical support for the Egyptian fleet of Soviet-supplied MiG-17 Frescos and MiG-21s. The Chinese used the aircraft as the basis for their J-9 project, which never ventured beyond the research phase.
Some time later the remaining six MiG-23MS examples and six MiG-23BNs, as well as 16 MiG-21MFs, two Sukhoi Su-20 Fitters, two MiG-21Us, two Mil Mi-8 Hips and ten KSR-2 were purchased for the Foreign Technology Division, a special department of the USAF, responsible for evaluating adversary technologies. These were exchanged for weapons and spares support, including AIM-9J/P Sidewinder missiles, which were installed on remaining Egyptian MiG-21s.
MiG-23s supplied by the Soviet Union to Mengistu Haile Mariam 's Derg were heavily used by the Ethiopian Air Force against the array of rebel guerillas fighting the government during the Ethiopian Civil War. According to a 1990 Human Rights Watch report, the attacks, often using napalm or phosphorus and cluster munitions, were not only aimed at the rebels, but against civilian populations (in both Eritrea and Ethiopia) and humanitarian convoys in a deliberate fashion.
Ethiopian MiG-23s were used in ground attack and strike missions during the border war with Eritrea from May 1998 to June 2000, even striking targets at the airport in the Eritrean capital city, Asmara on several occasions. Three Ethiopian MiG-23BNs were claimed shot down by Eritrean MiG-29s.
On 26 May, the Indian forces started air strikes during the Kargil War. Flying from the Indian airfields of Srinagar, Avantipur and Adampur, MiG-23 BN, joined the other Indian strike aircraft, MiG-21s, MiG-27s, Jaguars and Mirage 2000 in striking the enemy positions.
Data from Brassey's world aircraft systems directory, 1996/97
General characteristics
Performance
Armament.
According to the MiG-23ML manual, the MiG-23ML has a maximum sustained turn rate of 14.1 deg/sec and a maximum instantaneous turn rate of 16.7 deg/sec. The MiG-23ML accelerates from 600 km/h (373 mph) to 900 km/h (559 mph) in 12 seconds at the altitude of 1000 meters. The MiG-23 accelerates at the altitude of 1 km from 630 km/h (391 mph) to 1300 km/h (808 mph) in 30 seconds and at the altitude of 10–12 km will accelerate from Mach 1 to Mach 2 in 160 seconds.
MiG-23 monumentRelated development
Aircraft of comparable role, configuration, and era
Related lists
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